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Earnings Management:  
The Effects of National Audit Environment, Audit Quality and 
International Capital Markets  
 
Abstract 
This paper studies earnings management in an international context. More specifically, the 
effects of three factors on earnings management are studied: national audit environment, audit 
firm quality and reliance on international capital markets. National audit environments vary 
strongly in terms of independence rules, auditor education and auditor liability. Hence, it can 
be expected that the restrictions imposed by national audit environments on earnings 
management vary. However, there are two factors that can mitigate the national audit 
environment effect. First, there is strong evidence that audit firm quality, as indicated by the 
Big 5 and non-Big 5 dichotomy, affects earnings management opportunities for clients. In the 
context of this study an important issue is to what extent this quality effect overrides national 
differences. In other words, to what extent do the international audit firms provide a 
standardized high quality audit across different jurisdictions? Second, the reliance on 
international capital markets might reduce companies’ earnings management, irrespective of 
the opportunities provided by the national environment.  
The study uses data for the period 1991 - 1999 from listed firms in four jurisdictions: 
France, UK, the Netherlands and Germany. The total number of firm year observations is 
17,838. The results of the study suggest that national differences in audit environments are 
strongly affecting earnings management. While earnings management is also affected by the 
audit quality of the audit firm and the reliance on international capital markets, the effect is 
rather small.  
The evidence provided in this study is relevant for the current worldwide integration 
of capital markets and the acceptance of international accounting standards. For the 
international comparability of earnings, not only the standardization of financial reporting is 
important but also the standardization of enforcement across jurisdictions. The results of this 
study suggest that the enforcement of financial reporting still varies strongly across countries.    
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1.  Introduction 
This study examines the effects of differences in audit firm quality and national audit 
environment on earnings management. Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. 
First, Gore et al. (2001) pointed out that there is an “increasing interest in the impact of 
different economic environments and GAAP regimes on the attributes of accounting earnings 
(Pope and Walker, 1999; Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 2000) and on the incidence of 
earnings and forecast management (Brown and Higgins, 1999; Leuz et al., 2000)”.  Our paper 
contributes to this increasing interest by analysing the incidence of earnings management in 
four European countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These 
four countries vary in terms of their audit environment (independence rules, auditor education 
and auditor liability). We do not only provide descriptive rankings of these countries in terms 
of earnings management (see Leuz et al, 2000), but also perform univariate and multivariate 
statistical analyses to identify both the audit firm quality effects and the national audit 
environment effects. 
Secondly, we consider whether Big 5 auditors constitute a constraint on earnings 
management in the four European countries under study and if so, whether this constraint is 
uniform across countries.  
Finally, we consider whether a foreign exchange listing or a New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) listing influences the incidence of earnings management. It could be 
argued that companies relying on international capital markets, compared to companies 
relying on national capital markets, have different incentives and constraints with respect to 
earnings management.  
The results of this study are relevant for the current discussion on the international 
comparability of financial statements, and specifically the comparability of earnings. It is 
assumed that the acceptance of an international set of accounting standards, like the 
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International Accounting Standards (IASs), will be an important step in the international 
comparability of financial statements. However, the international comparability of earnings 
reported not only depends on the set of accepted accounting standards, but also on the 
national quality of audits and the constraints imposed on earnings management by the 
national audit environment.  
Related to this issue is whether the Big Five provide the same audit quality across 
countries. While the minimum levels of national audit quality might vary from country to 
country, it could be argued that the Big Five audit firms have a strong incentive to provide the 
same high audit quality level in different countries. The reason is that their clients attract 
capital from international markets. 
The evidence in the paper clearly indicates that companies in the European countries 
included in the study, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, engage in earnings 
management. Companies tend to avoid small losses and prefer to report small profits instead.  
However, the magnitude of earnings management is not uniform across the four countries.  In 
particular, the results suggest that companies in countries with a strict audit quality regime 
engage less in earnings management compared to companies in countries with a more flexible 
audit regime. The presence of a Big 5 audit firm is not capable of eliminating all of these 
significant country differences.  Finally, it is shown that a listing on a foreign stock exchange 
for companies audited by a Big 5 audit firm constitutes a constraint on the incidence of 
earnings management.   
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2.  Previous Literature 
International differences in earnings management 
Ball et al. (2000) suggest that the demand for accounting earnings is systematically different 
in code-law countries versus common-law countries.  Common-law countries are 
characterized by: transactions at “arms-length”; a diverse base of investors; and a relatively 
high risk of litigation.  In code-law countries, capital markets are less active.  Companies are 
more financed by banks, other financial institutions and the government, which results in less 
need for public disclosure.  Moreover, litigation rates are relatively low. 
Leuz et al. (2000) provide evidence that earnings management and loss avoidance 
practices are more prevalent in companies from code-law countries compared to common-law 
countries.  It is argued that the costs (e.g. litigation) and benefits (e.g. enhanced liquidity) for 
engaging in earnings management differ for managers and auditors in code-law countries 
versus common-law countries.  The expected benefits of earnings management appear to 
outweigh the expected costs for a firm in a code-law country. 
 
Audit constraint on earnings management 
Evidence has been provided that Big 51 audit firms constitute a constraint on earnings 
management. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) show that non-fraudulent clients of Big 5 
auditors are less likely to have errors or irregularities, which were considered to be a proxy 
for earnings management.  In a subsequent study, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1993) provided 
evidence that auditor-client disagreements, resulting from incentives to manage earnings, are 
more likely to occur in case of a Big 5 auditor. 
Becker et al. (1998) provide evidence that clients of non-Big 5 auditors report 
discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals 
                                                 
1 For convenience, this paper uses the term ‘Big 5 auditor’ to identify the large international audit firm networks. Some of the 
studies referred to were conducted before the mergers resulted in the reduction to 5 international audit networks.    
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reported by clients of Big 5 auditors.  Moreover, it was found that the mean and median of the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non-Big 5 auditors. 
Francis et al. (1999) report for a sample of NASDAQ firms that, even though Big 5 auditors 
have higher levels of total accruals, they also have lower amounts of estimated discretionary 
accruals. 
For UK firms, Gore et al. (2001) show that Big 5 auditors are more able to constrain 
earnings management than non-Big 5 auditors in the case that a high level of non-audit 
services is provided, measured by the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees. 
 
Measures of earnings management 
Different models have been suggested in the literature to measure earnings management.  
Healy and Whalen (1999) and Young (1999) provide a good overview of the earnings 
management literature and the different models used to measure earnings management.  We 
examine both earnings distributions (see Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Degeorge et al., 1999; Gore et al., 2001) and working capital accruals (see Dechow et al.1995; 
DeFond and Park, 1999; Peasnell et al., 2000) to detect earnings management. 
 
3. Development of Hypotheses 
The main argument in this paper concerns the effects of national laws and regulations 
regarding auditing on earnings management by companies. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, firms in countries with strict audit quality regimes 
report relatively lower absolute values of discretionary accruals compared to firms in 
countries with flexible audit quality regimes.  
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It can be expected that the impact of the type of audit quality regime on earnings management 
is influenced by the type of audit firm.  This expectation is based on the argument that Big 5 
audit firms attempt to control the quality of their audits across jurisdictions. As the production 
of their audits is based on internationally recognized brand names, they have an incentive to 
provide a uniform level of audit quality in different countries.  Consequently, it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals is less affected by the type of audit quality regime, in case of a Big 5 audit 
firm compared to a non-Big 5 audit firm. 
 
While the national laws and regulations might set a minimum level of audit quality, 
companies and their auditors might voluntarily opt for a higher audit quality level for capital 
market reasons. Companies relying on international capital markets do not only take the 
restrictions imposed by their national market into account, but also restrictions from other 
countries. For example, a Dutch company listed on the NYSE, is also affected by the 
restrictions imposed by the SEC. It can be expected that this will affect the level of earnings 
management by the Dutch company.     
 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, companies with international sources of capital will 
report relatively lower absolute values of discretionary accruals compared to firms 
with national sources of capital.  
 
Buijink et al. (1996) provides a detailed description of the auditing laws and regulations in the 
Member States of the European Union. On the basis of that description, the regulatory 
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systems in the countries included in this study are ranked as follows from a relatively strict 
audit quality regime to a more flexible audit quality regime: France; UK; the Netherlands; and 
Germany.  This classification is motivated by the presence or absence of laws and regulations, 
which aim to promote audit quality in these countries.  Table 1 provides an overview of these 
laws and regulations. 
 
    - INSERT TABLE 1- 
 
France is the country that has the highest number of laws and regulations that intend to 
improve audit quality.  In particular, France imposes restrictions on the minimal length of the 
audit mandate.  Moreover, management advisory services and advertising are not allowed.  
Statutory auditors are subject to reviews by peers and regulators. Listed firms are required to 
have a joint audit and the appointment of the statutory auditor has to be approved.  The UK is 
classified as the country with the second highest strict audit quality regime due to the high 
risk of litigation.  The Netherlands and Germany have more or less the same limited number 
of laws and regulations to safeguard audit quality.  However, since the risk of litigation is 
considered to be higher in the Netherlands than in Germany (see Blij et al., 1998), the 
Netherlands is ranked in the third position in terms of strictness of audit quality regime. 
 
4.  Sample Selection  
To collect data for this study, we used the June 2000 version of the Worldscope database.  
Data are collected for France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. All four 
countries have currently sizable and well-developed capital markets, but vary significantly in 
their regulatory regimes regarding auditing (Buijink et al. 1996). Data were collected for the 
period 1991-1999, resulting in a total of 29,628 firm year observations (France: 6822; 
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Germany: 7083; the Netherlands: 1809; UK: 13,914).  Consistent with previous research (e.g. 
Becker et al. 1998), financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utility companies (SIC 4000-
4999) were excluded.  Due to data limitations, the number of usable observations is reduced 
to 17,838 (France: 3904; Germany: 3992; the Netherlands: 1244; UK: 8698).  In most cases, 
for the companies that needed to be removed from the database, information was missing on 
their net income, especially in the early years of the period under study. All companies in our 
sample are listed firms.  
 
5.  Research Design 
Our paper builds on the research method applied by Gore et al. (2001).  They showed that 
earnings in the UK are distributed discontinuously around zero (small loss avoidance and 
achieve small profits), which is consistent with the results found in the US (Hayn, 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999).  However, Gore et al. (2001) show that 
the exclusion of discretionary accruals from current earnings causes the discontinuity to 
disappear.  In other words, their results suggest an explicit link between working capital 
accruals earnings management and a discontinuity in the distribution of earnings around zero.  
This finding motivates our choice to examine both earnings distributions and working capital 
accruals to detect earnings management. 
Consistent with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), the statistical significance of small 
loss avoidance is tested by examining whether the cross-sectional distributions of earnings 
levels are relatively smooth.  Smoothness is defined as follows: “the expected number of 
observations in any given interval is the average of the number of observations in the two 
immediately adjacent intervals (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997)”.  Operationally, the statistical 
test used to test smoothness is defined as follows (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997): 
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Standardized difference = (Observed number of observations in an interval – Expected 
number of observations in the interval) / Estimated standard 
deviation of difference 
 
The estimated standard deviation of difference equals the square root of the following 
expression (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997): 
(Estimated standard deviation of difference)2 = N.pi (1- pi) + ¼.N.(pi-1 + pi+1).(1- pi-1 - pi+1) 
where:  
N = Number of observations; 
pi = Probability that an observation will fall into interval i; 
pi-1 = Probability that an observation will fall into interval i-1; 
pi+1 = Probability that an observation will fall into interval i+1. 
 
Under the null hypothesis, the standardized difference follows a standard normal distribution 
with mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to one (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).  
In the description of the results, the standardized differences both left and right of zero are 
reported.  
 
Next to earnings distributions, we also examine working capital accruals. Similar with 
DeFond and Park (1999), we define working capital accruals as the change in non-cash 
working capital (WC).  Abnormal working capital accruals  (AWCA) are defined as realized 
working capital accruals minus normal working capital accruals.  Normal working capital is 
assumed to be a fixed proportion of sales (Dechow and Kothari, 1998; DeFond and Park, 
1999).   We approximate the expected working capital in the current year by the average 
working capital and sales of the three previous years.  This gives the following expression: 
  AWCAt = WCt – [(WC((t-1)+(t-2)+(t-3))/3)/Sales((t-1)+(t-2)+(t-3))/3))* St] 
where : 
AWCAt = Abnormal working capital accruals in year t; 
WCt = Working capital in year t ; 
WC((t-1)+(t-2)+(t-3))/3) = Average working capital in the three years preceding year t; 
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St = Sales in year t ; 
Sales((t-1)+(t-2)+(t-3))/3) = Average sales in the three years preceding year t. 
 
Subsequently, the abnormal working capital accruals of the year are scaled by the sales of that 
year. 
Our empirical analysis will focus on the absolute total value of discretionary accruals. 
Previous studies in this area tend to focus on positive discretionary accruals. The reason being 
that auditors have a higher risk of reputation loss in the case of upward managed earnings 
compared to downward managed earnings. Hence, audit quality differences would especially 
be revealed in case of upward managed earnings. However, in the countries under study, there 
might be variations in the direction of the incentives to manage earnings. For example, in 
more tax-oriented reporting systems (e.g. Germany), audit quality might be revealed by 
limiting the opportunities for negative discretionary accruals. Therefore we will focus on 
earnings management per se.  In this respect, Warfield et al. (1995) also indicated that the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals is a good proxy for the combined effect of income-
increasing and income-decreasing earnings management decisions. 
The three main variables of interest in this study are: (1) in which national auditing 
system the company operates; (2) whether the company is audited by a Big 5 or a non-Big 5 
auditor; and (3) whether the company relies on international capital markets. The effect of the 
national audit regime is measured with a dummy variable for each country under study. The 
effect of international capital markets is measured with a variable indicating whether the 
company has a foreign exchange listing and a variable indicating whether the company is 
listed on the NYSE. 
Consistent with previous studies on earnings management, the following variables are 
included in the model to control for earnings management incentives. First, we control for the 
size of a company proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets.  It is argued in the literature 
that larger firms prefer upward earnings management due to political costs (see Young, 1999; 
 11
Gore et al., 2001). Second, a leverage or gearing variable is included in the model (see 
Young, 1999; Gore et al., 2001).  Highly leveraged firms may have an incentive for income-
increasing earnings management in view of debt covenant violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994).  Alternatively, high leverage may induce income-decreasing earnings management in 
financially distressed firms in view of contractual renegotiations (Becker et al., 1998). Third, 
we include a performance measure as a control variable.  Consistent with Dechow et al. 
(1995) and Young (1999), we include cash flow from operating activities to control for 
underlying performance which may induce income-increasing earnings management.  Finally, 
we include industry dummies to control for industry effects on earnings management 
incentives.  Formally, the model looks as follows: 
AWCAt =  β0 +  β1 UK +  β2 FRA +  β3 NETH +  β4 B5NB5t +  β5 FORLISTt +  β6 NYSEt +   
   β7 LNASSETt +  β8 GEARt +  β9 OPCFt + β10 INDit +  εt 
where:  
AWCAt = Abnormal working capital accruals in year t; 
UK = Dummy variable (UK company = 1, else 0); 
FRA = Dummy variable (French company = 1, else 0); 
NETH = Dummy variable (Dutch company = 1, else 0); 
B5NB5t = Dummy variable (Company has Big 5 auditor = 1, else 0); 
FORLISTt = Dummy variable (Company has a foreign listing = 1, else 0); 
NYSEt = Dummy variable (Company is listed on the NYSE = 1, else 0); 
LNASSETt = Natural logarithm of total assets in year t; 
GEARt = Ratio of long term debt over common equity in year t; 
OPCFt = Cash flow from operating activities in year t. 
INDit = Industry dummies (SIC 10-17: Mining & Construction; SIC 20-39: Manufacturing; SIC 50-59: 
Wholesale trade; SIC 70-89: Services) 
It is noted that Germany (German company = 1, else 0) is the country of reference and SIC 01-09 (agriculture, 
forestry and fishing) is the industry of reference. 
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6.  Empirical Results  
Earnings distributions 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of earnings scaled by beginning of year total assets 
for the period 1991-1999 across the four countries included in the study.   
 
    - INSERT TABLE 2 -  
 
The distribution of scaled earnings for the pooled sample is illustrated in figure 1.   
 
    - INSERT FIGURE 1 -  
 
Figure 1 clearly shows a discontinuity around zero suggesting that European companies 
engage in earnings management. They prefer to avoid small losses and report small profits 
instead.  The significance of this discontinuity is confirmed by the statistical tests, presented 
in Table 3.   
    - INSERT TABLE 3 - 
 
Table 3 also reports the results of the distribution of scaled near-zero earnings for the 
individual countries.  The results indicate that the irregularity around zero is significant in the 
four countries under study.  These results are consistent with the findings in the UK (Gore et 
al., 2001) and in the US (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999).  
 
Working capital accruals 
The working capital accruals results relate to the year 1998.  As stated earlier, we define 
abnormal working capital accruals as realized working capital accruals minus expected 
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normal working capital accruals, measured by the average working capital and sales of the 
three previous years. Figures 2-5 illustrate the magnitude of abnormal working capital 
accruals in respectively France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.   
 
    - INSERT FIGURES 2-5 - 
 
The figures clearly suggest that the magnitude of earnings management is the highest in 
Germany, followed by the Netherlands, the UK and France.  This is also confirmed by the 
descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.  This ranking corresponds with our postulated 
ranking of countries in terms of strictness of audit quality regime.  Moreover, the ranking is 
consistent with the results reported by Leuz et al. (2000) comparing the magnitude of the 
absolute value of working accruals to the magnitude of the absolute value of operating cash 
flow across countries.   
 
    - INSERT TABLE 4 - 
 
Table 5 presents the univariate results for the pooled sample and the four countries separately.  
The results of the pooled sample show that the magnitude of income-increasing earnings 
management is significantly higher than the magnitude of income-decreasing earnings 
management.  Big 5 auditors constitute a constraint on both income-increasing and income-
decreasing earnings management.  This result is significant for the pooled sample and the UK 
sample.  Companies listed on a foreign stock exchange or on the NYSE tend to engage less in 
earnings management compared to companies that are not foreign listed, yet not significantly. 
 
    -INSERT TABLE 5 - 
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The results of the differences in earnings management practices across France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK are presented in table 6.  The test of means provide evidence that 
there are significant differences between these countries. 
 
    -INSERT TABLE 6 - 
 
For the pooled sample, the results in panel A of table 6 show that German companies engage 
significantly more in earnings management compared to companies in the UK, the 
Netherlands and France.  In addition, in the Netherlands companies engage significantly more 
in earnings management compared to the UK and France.  The only country difference that is 
not significant is between France and the UK.  These findings are in line with hypothesis 1  
stating that firms in countries with a flexible audit regime report relatively higher absolute 
values of discretionary accruals.  
In order to test whether the potential constraint of Big 5 auditors on earnings 
management is uniform across countries, the test of means is performed on the sample of 
companies with a Big 5 auditor and the sample of companies with a non-Big 5 auditor 
separately.  The results are presented in table 6, panel B and C.  For the sample of companies 
with a Big 5 auditor, panel B provides evidence that the difference across countries remain 
significant.  This would suggest that the audit quality of Big 5 audit firms is not uniform 
across countries.  For the sample of non-Big 5 audit firms, the results in panel C show that in 
Germany companies engage significantly more in earnings management compared to France 
and the UK.  Surprisingly, the other country differences are no longer significant.  These 
findings do not support hypothesis 2.  In contrast, the results imply that the flexibility of non-
Big 5 audit firms in accepting earnings management is relatively uniform across countries, 
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while the conservatism of Big 5 auditors in restricting earnings management does not appear 
to be uniform across countries. 
Table 7 presents the OLS regression results with Germany as the country of reference.  
 
    -INSERT TABLE 7- 
 
The multivariate results confirm the significant differences in the magnitude of earnings 
management across countries.  Companies in the UK, the Netherlands and France engage 
significantly less in earnings management compared to Germany. A listing on a foreign stock 
exchange is a significant constraint on earnings management.  Big 5 audit firms and a listing 
on the NYSE constitute a constraint on earnings management though not significantly.  The 
variable cash flow from operating activities controlling for underlying performance is 
significantly negative, as predicted.  Companies in the service industry (SIC 70-80) tend to 
engage significantly more in earnings management compared to other industries. 
Ball et al. (2000) state that “code-law accounting standards give greater discretion to 
managers in deciding when economic gains and losses are incorporated in accounting 
income”. Similarly, Leuz et al. (2000) show that earnings management appears to be more 
prevalent in code-law countries compared to common-law countries. Guenther and Young 
(2000) argue that in countries where there is conformity between financial accounting and tax 
accounting rules, “financial accounting information may differ from underlying economic 
activities because firms attempt to minimize taxable income”.  In this respect, it is tested 
whether the differences in results between the countries in our sample are not merely driven 
by potential differences in earnings management incentives between common-law versus 
code-law countries or conformity between financial and tax accounting rules.  Therefore, the 
OLS regression is performed on an alternative model including a dummy variable for 
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common-law (UK) versus code-law countries (Germany, France and the Netherlands) and a 
dummy variable for financial and tax accounting conformity (tax conformity in France and 
Germany), instead of the country dummies. The results, presented in table 8, show that both 
the common/code-law country dummy and the financial/tax accounting conformity dummy 
are significantly negative.  In addition, a Big 5 audit firm and a listing on a foreign stock 
exchange are significant constraints on earnings management.  However, a comparison of the 
adjusted R-Squares shows that the model including the country dummies (adjusted R-Square: 
26.1%) outperforms the model including the common/code-law country dummy and the 
financial/tax accounting conformity dummy (adjusted R-Square: 14.7%).  This implies that 
the country dummies increase the explanatory power of the model and suggests that earnings 
management differences between countries are not merely driven by the common-law versus 
code-law distinction and financial/tax accounting conformity.  For example, France and 
Germany are both code-law countries and both have conformity between financial accounting 
and tax rules.  However, France and Germany differ significantly in the extent to which they 
engage in earnings management.  
 
 -INSERT TABLE 8 – 
 
Analogous to the test of means, the regression analysis is also done on the Big 5 audit 
firm sample and the non-Big 5 audit firm sample separately.  The results are presented in 
table 9, panel A and B.   
 
    -INSERT TABLE 9 - 
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Consistent with the results of the test of means, the multivariate analysis shows that the 
country differences remain significant, except for the Netherlands, even though all companies 
are audited by a Big 5 audit firm.  The results further provide evidence that companies, 
audited by a Big 5 firm, that are listed on a foreign stock exchange engage significantly less in 
earnings management.   
The OLS regression results for the non-Big 5 audit firm sample are presented in panel 
B of table 9.  Consistent with the results of the test of means, the country difference in 
earnings management between Germany and the Netherlands is no longer significant for 
companies audited by a non-Big 5 firm.  The performance measure, cash flow from operating 
activities is a significant control variable.  Underperforming companies have a stronger 
incentive to manage their earnings. 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of international differences in audit 
quality and audit environment on earnings management.  The results of this study provide 
evidence that companies in Europe engage in earnings management.  Consistent with the 
findings in the US (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999) and the 
UK (Gore et al., 2001), our results clearly indicate a discontinuity of scaled earnings around 
zero in the countries included in the study.  This implies that companies in these countries 
prefer to avoid small losses and report small profits instead. 
Our results further demonstrate that the magnitude of earnings management is not 
uniform across the four countries.  In particular, the results suggest that companies in 
countries with flexible audit quality regimes (Germany and the Netherlands) report 
significantly higher absolute values of discretionary accruals compared to companies in 
countries with strict audit quality regimes (France and the UK).   
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It is further shown that the country differences remain nearly all significant even in the 
presence of a Big 5 audit firm. This finding could imply that the conservatism of Big 5 audit 
firms in restricting earnings management does not appear to be uniform across countries.   
Our results with respect to the incidence of earnings management by companies 
attracting international sources of capital are mixed.  Companies audited by a Big 5 firm that 
are listed on a foreign stock exchange engage significantly less in earnings management.  In 
contrast, companies, audited by a non-Big 5 firm, that are listed on a foreign stock exchange 
do not engage significantly less in earnings management.  This result casts doubts upon the 
quality of certain non-Big 5 audit firms by allowing the earnings management practices of 
their clients to a great extent. 
 The results of this study are subject to the following limitations.  First, as in almost 
every cross-country study, it can be questioned whether the observed differences between 
countries are really attributable to differences in earnings management. One could argue that 
they are driven by economic and institutional differences. We have partly controlled for 
economic differences by including industry differences.  In addition, we believe that there are 
no major differences in the underlying economic situation between the four countries in the 
sample during the period under study.  Therefore, the risk that economic differences have a 
significant impact on the results is considered to be low. It is acknowledged that there are 
institutional differences other than national audit environment between the countries under 
study. However, we have partly taken these institutional differences into account by 
controlling for common-law versus code-law accounting standards and conformity between 
financial and tax accounting rules.  For example, although France and Germany both have 
code-law accounting standards and conformity between financial and tax accounting rules, 
they differ significantly in the extent to which they engage in earnings management. 
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 Second, consistent with previous research on earnings management, we have 
controlled for the following earnings management incentives: size, leverage and performance. 
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that there may be other incentives to manage earnings across 
the countries in the sample that have not been explicitly controlled for. 
Finally, the results suggest that there is an association between the magnitude of 
earnings management and the level of audit regulation. However, further research is needed to 
draw conclusions on the effectiveness of regulation in the audit market. 
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Table 1: Overview of laws and regulations with respect to audit quality across countries 
 
 UK NETH GERMANY FRANCE 
Length of the first audit mandate 1 yeara n/r n/r 6 years 
 
Length of the renewed audit 
mandate 
 
1 yeara n/r n/r 6 years 
Requirement on the number of 
statutory auditors 
no no no yes  
a joint audit is 
required for i.a. listed 
firms 
 
Requirement of approval of 
appointment of statutory auditor 
no 
except for banks and 
other regulated 
industries 
no no  
except for banks and 
other regulated 
industries 
yes 
for listed firms, banks 
and other regulated 
industries 
 
Disclosure of audit fees yes no no no 
 
MAS allowed for statutory auditors yesb yes yesc no 
 
Advertising allowed yes yes nod no 
 
Peer review no no no yes  
every 3 years for 
listed firms 
 
Review by regulators yes  
every 5 years for 
listed firms 
 
no no yes  
every year 
Risk of litigation high moderate low low 
 
                                                 
a  Private companies have the right to elect to do away with the requirement to re-elect statutory auditors each 
year.  In that case, the statutory auditor remains appointed until positive action is taken to terminate the 
appointment. 
b The provision of bookkeeping and accounting services is forbidden in the case of listed or public-interest 
companies except if this is of a routine clerical nature.  Audit firms within the same legal entity cannot provide 
legal services. 
c The provision of bookkeeping and accounting services is forbidden. 
d Ethical advertising (general information on the auditor or audit firm) is allowed.  However, unethical 
advertising (advertising that is directly aimed to gain new clients) is not allowed. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of scaled earnings across countries 
 
 N Mean Std. dev. 25% 50% 75% 
France 3904 1.11 2.28 0.16 0.68 1.76 
Germany 3992 0.88 2.12 0.06 0.58 1.55 
The Netherlands 1244 0.91 1.19 0.34 0.72 1.22 
UK 8698 0.89 2.24 0.04 0.64 1.31 
Pooled 17930 0.96 2.21 0.09 0.65 1.44 
 
Note: Earnings are measured as annual net income scaled by beginning of year total assets. 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of scaled earnings for pooled sample 
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Table 3: Distribution of scaled near-zero earnings across countries 
 
 POOLED 
(n=499) 
FRANCE 
(n=51) 
GERMANY 
(n=57) 
NETH. 
(n=12) 
UK 
(n=379) 
Std.difference 
left of zero 
(p-value) 
-9.96 
(0.000) 
-2.18 
(0.014) 
-2.88 
(0.001) 
-2.46 
(0.006) 
-9.16 
(0.000) 
Std.difference 
right of zero 
(p-value) 
16.35 
(0.000) 
2.6 
(0.004) 
5.16 
(0.000) 
1.09 
(0.137) 
15.79 
(0.000) 
 
Note: First interval right of zero: [0.000, 0.005), second interval: [0.005, 0.010), etc. 
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Figure 2: Distribution abnormal working capital accruals in France 
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Figure 3: Distribution abnormal working capital accruals in Germany 
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Figure 4: Distribution abnormal working capital accruals in the Netherlands 
AWCA
8,00
7,00
6,00
5,00
4,00
3,00
2,00
1,00
0,00
-1,00
-2,00
-3,00
-4,00
-5,00
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
40
30
20
10
0
 
 
Figure 5: Distribution abnormal working capital accruals in the UK 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of abnormal working capital accruals in absolute value 
across countries 
 
 N Mean Std. dev. 25% 50% 75% 
France 356 0.067 0.153 0.012 0.030 0.062 
Germany 381 1.281 1.638 0.212 0.723 1.699 
The Netherlands 135 0.896 1.160 0.235 0.472 1.143 
UK 894 0.080 0.240 0.014 0.031 0.069 
Pooled 1766 0.399 0.987 0.020 0.052 0.245 
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Table 5: Univariate results 
 
 
 POOLED UK NETH GERM FRANCE 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT      
AWCA < 0: income-decreasing -0.344 (n=928) -0.088 (n=472) -0.760 (n=73) -1.15 (n=181) -0.0667 (n=202) 
AWCA ≥ 0: income-increasing 0.4601 (n=838) 0.072 (n=422) 1.055 (n=62) 1.39 (n=200) 0.0689 (n=154) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=2.46 (0.014) t=0.9 (0.32) t=-1.47 (0.143) t=-1.4 (0.153) t=-0.138 (0.89) 
      
BIG 5 vs. NON BIG 5                          
Absolute value AWCA      
Big 5 0.355 (n=1256) 0.07 (n=706) 0.89 (n=129) 1.19 (n=221) 0.072 (n=200) 
Non-Big 5 0.546 (n=458) 0.11 (n=156) 0.82 (n=6) 1.40 (n=155) 0.061 (n=141) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=-3.50 (0.000) t=-2.0 (0.04) t=0.14 (0.884) t=-1.21 (0.226) t=0.65 (0.512) 
      
AWCA < 0: income-decreasing      
Big 5 -0.321 (n=691) -0.07 (n=385) -0.75 (n=70) -1.12 (n=117) -0.076 (n=119) 
Non-Big 5 -0.432 (n=216) -0.15 (n=75) -0.87 (n=3) -1.22 (n=61) -0.051 (n=77) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=1.735 (0.083) t=2.3 (0.02) t=0.24 (0.806) t=0.45 (0.648) t=-1.2 (0.213) 
      
AWCA ≥ 0: income-increasing      
Big 5 0.3971 (n=565) 0.069 (n=321) 1.06 (n=59) 1.28 (n=104) 0.066 (n=81) 
Non-Big 5 0.6475 (n=242) 0.075 (n=81) 0.78 (n=3) 1.52 (n=94) 0.072 (n=64) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=-2.81 (0.005) t=-0.28 (0.77) t=0.32 (0.746) t=-0.93 (0.353) t=-0.20 (0.837) 
      
FOREIGN LISTING       
Absolute value AWCA      
Foreign listing 0.35 (n=83) 0.058 (n=35) 0.56 (n=17) 0.87 (n=18) 0.13 (n=13) 
No foreign listing 0.40 (n=1683) 0.081 (n=859) 0.94 (n=118) 1.3 (n=363) 0.065 (n=343) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=-0.46 (0.64) t=-0.55 (0.579) t=-1.2 (0.21) t=-1.08 (0.28) t=1.5 (0.12) 
      
AWCA < 0: income-decreasing      
Foreign listing -0.34 (n=43) -0.077 (n=22) -0.66 (n=8) -0.77 (n=10) -0.02 (n=3) 
No foreign listing -0.34 (n=885) -0.088 (n=450) -0.77 (n=65) -1.17 (n=171) -0.06 (n=199) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=-0.01 (0.987) t=0.174 (0.862) t=0.34 (0.73) t=0.88 (0.379) t=0.57 (0.56) 
      
AWCA ≥ 0: income-increasing      
Foreign listing 0.35 (n=40) 0.026 (n=13) 0.47 (n=9) 0.99 (n=8) 0.16 (n=10) 
No foreign listing 0.46 (n=798) 0.073 (n=409) 1.15 (n=53) 1.41 (n=192) 0.06 (n=144) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=-0.59 (0.55) t=-1.01 (0.311) t=-1.2 (0.20) t=-0.63 (0.52) t=1.7 (0.07) 
      
NYSE LISTING      
Absolute value AWCA      
NYSE listing 0.25 (n=60) 0.06 (n=31) 0.62 (n=7) 0.77 (n=11) 0.039 (n=11) 
No NYSE listing 0.39 (n=1489) 0.08 (n=775) 0.91 (n=110) 1.24 (n=324) 0.07 (n=310) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=-1.11 (0.26) t=-0.5 (0.61) t=-0.62 (0.53) t=-0.96 (0.336) t=-0.66 (0.50) 
      
AWCA < 0: income-decreasing      
NYSE listing -0.29 (n=36) -0.059 (n=21) -0.76 (n=4) -1.16 (n=5) -0.05 (n=6) 
No NYSE listing -0.33 (n=775) -0.09 (n=389) -0.80 (n=57) -1.09 (n=152) -0.707 (n=177) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=0.34 (0.73) t=0.47 (0.634) t=0.08 (0.93) t=-0.11 (0.90) t=0.24 (0.807) 
      
AWCA ≥ 0: income-increasing      
NYSE listing 0.19 (n=24) 0.06 (n=10) 0.43 (n=3) 0.45 (n=6) 1.98 (n=5) 
No NYSE listing 0.45 (n=714) 0.07 (n=356) 1.02 (n=53) 0.38 (n=172) 0.074 (n=133) 
Difference (significance) (2-tailed) t=-1.11 (0.26) t=-0.21 (0.82) t=-0.67 (0.502) t =-1.2 (0.22) t=-0.64 (0.517) 
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Table 6: Test of means 
 
Panel A: Pooled sample 
 
 
Multiple Comparisons of absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals: Bonferroni test 
 
Country i Country j Mean difference (i-j) Standard error Significance 
Germany France 1.213 0.062 0.000 
 The Netherlands 0.385 0.084 0.000 
 UK 
 
1.200 0.051 0.000 
France The Netherlands -0.828 0.085 0.000 
 UK 
 
-0.012 0.053 1.000 
The Netherlands UK 0.815 0.078 0.000 
 
 
Panel B: Big 5 audit firm sample 
 
 
Multiple Comparisons of absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals: Bonferroni test 
 
Country i Country j Mean difference (i-j) Standard error Significance 
Germany France 1.127 0.076 0.000 
 The Netherlands 0.300 0.087 0.004 
 UK 
 
1.128 0.060 0.000 
France The Netherlands -0.827 0.089 0.000 
 UK 
 
0.0004 0.063 1.000 
The Netherlands UK 0.827 0.075 0.000 
 
 
Panel C: Non-Big 5 audit firm sample 
 
 
Multiple Comparisons of absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals: Bonferroni test 
 
Country i Country j Mean difference (i-j) Standard error Significance 
Germany France 1.348 0.119 0.000 
 The Netherlands 0.580 0.426 1.000 
 UK 
 
1.293 0.116 0.000 
France The Netherlands -0.767 0.426 0.437 
 UK 
 
-0.055 0.119 1.000 
The Netherlands UK 0.712 0.426 0.571 
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Table 7: OLS regression results (Test model) 
 
Pooled sample 
 
Variables Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard error t-statistic Significance 
Constant 0.944 0.389 2.429 0.015** 
UK -1.017 0.060 -17.041 0.000*** 
FRA -1.025 0.077 -13.394 0.000*** 
NETH -0.170 0.087 -1.957 0.051* 
B5NB5 -0.047 0.052 -0.915 0.360 
FORLIST -0.212 0.093 -2.287 0.022** 
NYSE -0.016 0.111 -0.151 0.880 
LNASSET 0.009 0.018 0.569 0.569 
GEAR -0.000 0.000 -0.102 0.919 
OPCF -0.000 0.000 -2.255 0.024** 
SIC10-17 0.105 0.102 1.023 0.306 
SIC20-39 -0.022 0.070 -0.321 0.748 
SIC50-59 -0.030 0.080 -0.388 0.698 
SIC70-89 0.147 0.083 1.769 0.077* 
*p < .10, **p < .05, *** p < .01 
R-Square: 0.270     F-value: 32.808 
Adjusted R-Square: 0.261    Significance: 0.000 
 
 
Variables: 
Dependent variable:  
AWCAt = Abnormal working capital accruals in year t 
 
Independent variables: 
UK = Dummy variable (UK company = 1, else 0); 
FRA = Dummy variable (French company = 1, else 0); 
NETH = Dummy variable (Dutch company = 1, else 0); 
B5NB5t = Dummy variable (Company has Big 5 auditor = 1, else 0); 
FORLISTt = Dummy variable (Company has a foreign listing = 1, else 0); 
NYSEt = Dummy variable (Company is listed on the NYSE = 1, else 0); 
LNASSETt = Natural logarithm of total assets in year t; 
GEARt = Ratio of long term debt over common equity in year t; 
OPCFt = Cash flow from operating activities in year t. 
SIC 10-17: Mining & Construction 
SIC 20-39: Manufacturing 
SIC 50-59: Wholesale trade 
SIC 70-89: Services 
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Table 8: OLS regression results (Alternative model) 
Pooled sample 
 
Variables Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard error t-statistic Significance 
Constant 0.690 0.423 1.632 0.103 
COMLAW -0.849 0.079 -10.747 0.000*** 
TAXCONF -0.304 0.085 -3.571 0.000*** 
B5NB5 -0.106 0.055 -1.910 0.056* 
FORLIST -0.170 0.100 -1.705 0.088* 
NYSE -0.025 0.119 -0.210 0.834 
LNASSET 0.015 0.019 0.823 0.410 
GEAR -0.000 0.000 -0.206 0.837 
OPCF -0.000 0.000 -2.657 0.008*** 
SIC10-17 0.099 0.110 0.905 0.365 
SIC20-39 0.034 0.075 0.466 0.641 
SIC50-59 -0.007 0.086 -0.093 0.926 
SIC70-89 0.108 0.089 1.213 0.225 
*p < .10, **p < .05, *** p < .01 
R-Square: 0.156     F-value: 17.838 
Adjusted R-Square: 0.147    Significance: 0.000 
 
 
where: 
COMLAW = Dummy variable (COMLAW = 1, in case of common-law country, else COMLAW = 0, in case of 
code-law country); 
TAXCONF = Dummy variable (TAXCONF = 1, in case of country with conformity between tax and accounting 
rules, else TAXCONF = 0).
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Table 9: OLS regression results 
 
Panel A: Big 5 audit firm sample 
 
 
Variables Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard error t-statistic Significance 
Constant 1.008 0.409 2.466 0.014** 
UK -0.956 0.069 -13.823 0.000*** 
FRA -0.957 0.088 -10.835 0.000*** 
NETH -0.111 0.091 -1.213 0.226 
FORLIST -0.201 0.091 -2.212 0.027** 
NYSE -0.033 0.109 -0.031 0.975 
LNASSET 0.001 0.018 0.091 0.927 
GEAR 0.000 0.000 0.676 0.499 
OPCF -0.000 0.000 -1.387 0.166 
SIC10-17 0.129 0.110 1.171 0.242 
SIC20-39 -0.020 0.076 -0.268 0.789 
SIC50-59 -0.040 0.085 -0.471 0.638 
SIC70-89 0.115 0.090 1.281 0.200 
*p < .10, **p < .05, *** p < .01 
R-Square:  0.255                  F-value: 25.841 
Adjusted R-Square: 0.245    Significance: 0.000 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Non-Big 5 audit firm sample 
 
 
Variables Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard error t-statistic Significance 
Constant 0.087 1.081 0.081 0.936 
UK -1.199 0.127 -9.418 0.000*** 
FRA -1.192 0.164 -7.286 0.000*** 
NETH -0.429 0.385 -1.113 0.267 
FORLIST -0.458 0.517 -0.885 0.377 
NYSE -0.364 0.640 -0.569 0.570 
LNASSET 0.058 0.049 1.182 0.238 
GEAR -0.000 0.000 -1.588 0.114 
OPCF -0.000 0.000 -1.995 0.047** 
SIC10-17 0.070 0.272 0.260 0.795 
SIC20-39 -0.035 0.175 -0.201 0.841 
SIC50-59 -0.033 0.211 -0.159 0.874 
SIC70-89 0.254 0.204 1.246 0.214 
*p < .10, **p < .05, *** p < .01 
R-Square: 0.315     F-value: 9.114 
Adjusted R-Square: 0.280    Significance: 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
